

On the Waterfront:

Contending Visions of an Urban Future and *Shimin* Life in Kaohsiung

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The seaside neighborhood of Hámásing materialized from the construction of Kaohsiung Harbor in the 1900s and declined as the city's transportation center moved eastward and inland. With the inauguration of a rapid transit system in 2009 and the redevelopment of the coastal region for commerce and tourism in recent years, it reemerged and metamorphosed into a tourist destination. As the city government moves ahead with the new transport network and developing tourism, local organizations center their arguments for a more inclusive city on the preservation of railway facilities and reclaiming neighborhood streets via a number of new activities. By considering on one hand the redevelopment of the waterfront by a city government trying to rebrand Kaohsiung as a global capital and secure popular support, and on the other, local efforts to preserve a train station from the Japanese colonial period and other actions taken to (re)claim city streets, this article examines how a cityscape designed for capital flow and political control is reinvented and reinterpreted by its residents as the Hámásing neighborhood is squeezed in the city's post-industrial transformation.

Keywords: Kaohsiung, railway, street, infrastructure of mobility, modern planning.

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Sitting by a craft stall on Jiesing (Jiexing) Second Street, observing the crowd mingling with vendors at a weekend street fair, Chia remarked sarcastically, “I wish *our* house had collapsed.”¹ A short distance away on the same street, a wooden house had crumpled a few years ago when construction of Kaohsiung Metro Rapid Transit System (KMRT) was under way. “They had to dig deep to build the subway and the station.” She explained. “There was too much vibration from the heavy machinery and the house couldn’t take it.” The owner had received generous compensation from the city and KMRT for the loss. In the meantime, Chia’s parents had to endure years of noise, dust, partial street closures and other measures to divert traffic from the construction, and the fear that their house might not hold up as the city’s newest project moved along. When KMRT was completed and life seemed to return to normal, the city suddenly hit them with an eviction notice, demanding the land on which their house sat to build a parking lot. “Had our house gone down, we would have at least gotten something in return.” Chia added. “In the end we got nothing but headache.” Although Chia and her neighbors were eventually able to keep their houses after local non-governmental organizations intervened, she feels it is only a matter of time before they are asked to move again. After all, Jiesing Street is only one block from KMRT’s Sizihwan (Xiziwan) Station and within walking distance of such popular tourist attractions as the Pier-2 Art Center, Takao Railway Museum,² and Shaochuantou Wharf.

These current and former transportation sites attest to how the fate of the area unofficially known as Hámásing has been tightly intertwined with Kaohsiung’s transportation infrastructure. Even the name itself is a Minnan adaptation of Hamasen, the Japanese name for the rail line that used to run along the coast from Takao Depot (now Takao Railway Museum) to the harbor. Crushed by or left out of the development of the city, residents like those living in the house destroyed during

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- 1 By “our house,” Chia means her parents’ house. As commonly practiced in Taiwan, grown-up sons and daughters continue to refer to their parents’ residences or their childhood homes as their own house (*jia*) even if they no longer reside there (Chang 2005). Romanization of place names and street names is based on the city’s official practice as shown on its websites, street signs, and tourism brochures.
 - 2 The museum’s name in Chinese is “dagou” but its official English name is not a direct transliteration of the Chinese characters. Instead, it is rendered Takao, the Japanese name for Kaohsiung. Dagou (Tákáu in Minan) is the old name of Kaohsiung.

construction or nearly destroyed to make way for a parking lot have seen little but failed promises. But Hámásing's story is also a story of grasping new possibilities and envisioning alternative futures. As new transportation facilities displace old ones and waterfront development threatens to wipe out an old neighborhood, local organizations argue that a more inclusive city must make room for the preservation of old railway facilities; residents and activists stake claims by observing, walking around, and making use of neighborhood streets. These contending visions and practices are not external to existing facilities and urban designs but grow side by side, along with, or from them.

Infrastructures promise unending flow, smooth circulation, seamless exchange, and the integration of urban, regional, national, and global spaces. They define the relationship between citizens and the state, and bind the citizenry into a collectivity by suggesting equal access and delivery of services to all. In consequence, they allude to the prospect of inclusion, progress, and economic growth that rely on extensive and uninterrupted connectivity (Harvey 2012, Howe et al. 2016, Khan 2006, Knox and Harvey 2011, Larkin 2013). That capacity to form connections and the promise of benefits for all, however, also makes infrastructure a potential conduit for different linkages and alternative political articulations.³

Looking at the redevelopment of waterfront by a city government seeking to rebrand Kaohsiung for global capital and to secure popular support, the preservation of a train station dated to the Japanese colonial period (1895-1945), and the actions taken by local groups to (re)claim city streets, this article examines how a cityscape designed for capital flow and political control became reinvented and reinterpreted as Hámásing comes under pressure from the city's post-industrial transformation. Facilities and spaces produced through previous state-backed planning may be deployed, borrowed, or usurped by successive regimes and different groups of actors once they no longer serve their intended economic and political functions. While transportation facilities have been deployed by the current administration as symbols of development, global connectivity, and modernization, their very character as a modern product that links regions within and beyond the city also provides a terrain in which alternative ways of inhabiting the city's space and history can be imagined. That the streets and transportation facilities are "public," both in terms of ownership and use, allows preservationists and NGOs to stake claims on these shared spaces

3 See, for example, Harvey's (2012) study on road construction and its disruption in Peru; Simone (2014) on Jakarta residents' ways of "making the city work"; and Von Schnitzler (2013) on prepaid meters in South Africa.

and historical remains, whether through physical occupation or narratives about how they want to connect that past to the global and the city.

Under and Above

Transport networks are systems that facilitate movement, exchange, and communication across distances and at different scales. Like other infrastructure, they are “channels that maintain and create relationships between and among places, persons, and things” (Kleinman 2014: 293). From this perspective, the “infra” in infrastructure is seen as a base, and infrastructures can be understood as a support-system that “shapes how people relate to the city and to each other” by “affecting where and how people and things move across time and space” (Rodgers and O’Neill 2012: 403). Through determining the directions and extent of various flows and movements, infrastructural networks demarcate boundaries, produce and maintain internal divisions, and map out political and economic relations within and across borders. The capacity to facilitate communications, exchanges, and connections and to delineate relationship between citizenry and the state makes infrastructure a powerful political tool on the one hand, but one composed of unstable “sites” and “terrains” from where unforeseen connections and meanings might arise on the other hand (Khan 2006, Larkin 2008). Swati Chattopadhyay (2012) suggests a second meaning of “infra” in infrastructure as the connection and relation “hidden” and “beyond” the purview of its designers. She proposes that “the infra refers...not to that what lies ‘below’ but to that which becomes visible once the contingencies are aligned in material and human terms” (ibid.: 249). Looking at infrastructure as nodes of connectivity, channels of communication, and conduit for meaning-making calls for going beyond its designated functions and symbolic logic to map out emerging linkages and outline the conditions that make certain connections possible and visible.

In her seminal work that calls for an ethnography of infrastructure, Susan Star identifies one of its key properties as being “invisible” and “part of the background for other kinds of work” (1999: 380). She maintains that infrastructure only becomes visible when breakdown occurs (Star 1999; see also Star and Ruthleder 1996). However, railways, streets, transit systems and other transport facilities embody a paradoxical quality of being simultaneously invisible and visible. They are the “invisible” base that offers support for things and people to move but are also the visible exterior and physical framework for the “bundling” of other underground networks (Graham and Marvin 2001). Although infrastructure often appears as “historical urban constants buried beneath streets and walls or ignored due to their very consistent familiarity” (Graham and McFarlane 2015: 12), its design and

implementation nonetheless gives physical structure to urban landscapes and has profoundly shaped how modern cities are envisioned. As Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin (2001) have argued, the development of modern networked infrastructure that spans space and time requires meticulous calculation, comprehensive organization, and technological innovation. Infrastructure therefore embodies the ideal of progress and scientific rationality that underpins the conception of city as abstract object to be managed and controlled. Envisioning the city as an integrated whole and as something that can be efficiently grasped, calculated, and organized produces a planning aesthetic that favors standardization and integration, and prioritizes flows, circulations, and connections.⁴ This spatial order is most clearly expressed in the abstract space of rationally conceived urban street systems and transport networks that overlay the many lived social worlds and their seemingly messy arrangements.

Produced through similar technologies and arranged in the same abstract spatial order, mobility infrastructure often assumes a similar configuration and is perceived as decontextualized transient space that sits in the background. However, due to its visibility and association with progress, at times its spaces can attain iconic status as representations of state power, technology, capital, and even local distinctiveness (Dennis 2008).⁵ The values and ideologies imbued in these landscapes, facilities, and architecture, however, are never stable and can be loosened, transformed, reworked, or overturned in new situations.

As material expressions of planning theories and practices that often carry with them ideals about urban life and social organization, infrastructural networks have “tended to be central to the normative aspirations of planners, reformers, modernists, and social activists to define their notion of a desirable urban order: the good city” (2001: 12). Streets in particular have played a central role in the imagination of urban life (Berman 1988, Fyfe 1998). At various times, they have been conceived as “arteries” for circulation (Ellin 1997) and “machines” or “systems” of movement (Berman 1988, Gold 1998, Holston 1989) that can improve the working of the city. In the name of progress, rationality, and function, the physical layout of city

4 See, also, Scott (1998) on the prioritization of visibility, legibility, and order in formal planning and the resultant disorder.

5 There is a broad spectrum, from invisibility to spectacle or monumentality, deployed for emotional, political, or social effects when it comes to infrastructure (Graham and Marvin 2001, Larkin 2013). See, for example, Dalakoglou (2010) on “infrastructure fetishism” associated with motorways and the ways Albanians “reconstruct” the road through practices and discourses; Schwenkel (2015) on the “technopolitics of visibility” in Vietnam; and Sneath (2009) on electric lighting in rural Mongolia.

streets imposes state control and defines the relationship between citizens and the state (Scott 1998). Planning for traffic and the deliberate removal of street corners in Brasilia, for example, engendered an urban space that is in conflict with local conception of the street's role in defining the public and private domains of social life (Holston 1989). By introducing a different conception of public and the private, it expanded the state's reach in regulating civic life. Streets are also the ground on which modern(ist) urban planning has been criticized for its failure to acknowledge the dynamics of urban communal life (Jacobs 1961). This ideal of urban streets as open space for a self-regulating and properly behaved public, ironically, also inspired planning practices that aim to pacify city streets and create vibrant commercial activities so that they can be safe for and appealing to (re)investment. The blending of privatized open spaces and commodified public streets runs counter to another ideal of city streets, that of streets as a democratic public space where urban diversity thrives and unmediated encounters between different groups, the exchange of ideas, and political protests can take place (Lees 1998, Mitchell 2003). These diverging visions underscore how the streets are contested ground where different ideals intersect and alternative viewpoints are fought out, sometimes literally.

In the story of Hámásing, streets and the transport network are a very visible and at times quite active constituent of the neighborhood. In this small corner of the largest city in southern Taiwan where everything used to flow to and move through, the railways, the streets, and the harbor have played and continue to play an important role in its making and remaking. The process through which this landscape is produced and the vision, history, and experience embedded in it are being recalled and brought to the surface by various actors in their attempt to construct the city's future. The following sections will look into these contending visions by examining the transformation of Kaohsiung's harbor area, the preservation debates centered on rail facilities and a particular city block, and efforts to (re)claim the streets as a democratic public space.




Figure 1

Created by Naomi H. Hsu 許琇姝

The Ocean Capital

Wedged between Takao Mountain and the coast, Hámásing materialized from the construction of Kaohsiung Harbor in the 1900s. It declined when the Japanese built a bigger new train station inland and designed a new downtown to go with it. With the inauguration of a rapid transit system in 2009 and the redevelopment of coastal region for commerce and tourism, the neighborhood reemerged and was transformed into a tourist destination, accommodating the thousands of visitors brought by tour buses and the subway daily.⁶ Sizihwan, the terminal station of KMRT's orange line, sits next to the Takao Railway Museum. The city's official sightseeing shuttle, the *wenhua gongche* (culture bus) stops at the station for visitors bound for the former British Consulate, Daitian Temple, Wude Martial Arts Center, and the fish market.⁷ Behind the museum, in what used to be a rail yard, is Takao Railway Cultural Park. The tracks and locomotive engines on display are a popular playground for children while the open lawn provides ample space for outdoor activities and performances. A little further to the southeast is the Pier-2 Art Center,

6 According to statistics released by Kaohsiung Transportation Bureau in 2015, Hámásing attracts 1.4 million visitors annually, averaging 4,000 visitors per day. http://www.tbkc.gov.tw/comm01_01_Info.aspx?GthOHij43+/TBauM9bKo7qv88PaTVSjn. Accessed May 30, 2016.

7 The British Consulate includes two buildings constructed in 1879 and a trail linking them. Wude Martial Arts Center was a *butokuden* (martial arts dojo) during the Japanese period. After its restoration in 2004, the building resumed its function as a dojo for kendō practice. Daitian Temple was built in 1949 on a site formerly occupied by the city hall during the Japanese period. In addition to its religious functions, it also houses a small museum.

an exhibition complex composed of converted harbor warehouses; it is a popular location for filming movies and television dramas. If they so desire, visitors can board the ferry to Cijin (Qijin) Island where they can sample fresh seafood. Alternatively, they can rent bicycles from rentals at street corners and bike to Shaochuantou Wharf for summer treats such as shaved ice and cold drinks, available year-round since the weather is presumably always warm in the tropical city.

Diners on the pier, sightseeing cruises, and attractions along the coast give the city a vibrant waterfront scene. The subway system and roads leading there also suggest easy access to the oceanfront from every point of the city. However, “the construction of spaces of mobility and flow for some....always involves the construction of barriers for others” (Graham and Marvin 2001: 11). Wide roads leading from Kaohsiung Railway Station, downtown, and the export processing zone in southern Kaohsiung to the harbor have expedited flows between zones of production and commerce for decades. Coastal rail lines that connect Kaohsiung Harbor to industrial zones facilitate the transportation of goods to the harbor. Amidst these flows, the city is also divided by rail tracks and canals. Taiwan’s major rail line, the Western Main Route, cuts through the middle of the city and traffic between north and south depends on a limited number of railroad crossings, bridges, and tunnels. Branch lines extending from the coastal lines further cut across Kaohsiung’s space, with more than fifty railroad crossings. In addition, until the 1990s, gates, walls, and controlled access points were very common in the city.

Despite its nickname, “the Harbor Metropolis” (*gangdu*), Kaohsiung and its waterfront have not always been closely linked. Kaohsiung Harbor and surrounding regions were not open to the public due to restrictions imposed by the harbor authority and the navy. The harbor encompassed nearly the entire coastline of pre-merger (2010) Kaohsiung City, running from Siaogan (Xiaogang) District in the south to Gushan District in the north to Takao Mountain below which Hámásing sits. Today, people hike the trails and climb the steps to the Takao Shrine⁸ overlooking Hámásing and Kaohsiung Harbor to take in the city and photograph the splendid

8 The official name is Kaohsiung Martyrs’ Shrine. However, preservationists defiantly refer to it as Takao Shrine (*gaoxiong shenshe*) and on some official English tourism material, the city government also adopts the name Takao Shrine. It was built in 1928 as a Shinto shrine. In an attempt to purge the Japanese legacy in Taiwan, the Chinese Nationalist government has razed most Shinto shrines on the island. Although Takao Shrine escaped complete demolition, much of its structure had been refurbished, adding Chinese elements and renaming it the Kaohsiung Martyrs’ Shrine to honor Nationalist revolutionary martyrs. See Amae (2011) on the destruction, alteration, preservation, and restoration of symbolic structures of Japanese colonialism such as Shinto shrines and martial arts centers in Taiwan.

view. But fewer than thirty years ago, any attempt to snap a picture from the top of Takao Mountain could result in legal sanction because then it was considered an important strategic point for the army, and civilians were prohibited from accessing certain parts of the mountain. North of Takao Mountain, Zuoying District houses the naval base. And next to Zuoying is Nanzih (Nanzi), the hub of state-run heavy industry enterprises. While not entirely off limits, family housing for state employees and the military occupy small self-contained pockets inside the city, especially in Zuoying and Nanzih. With the heavy military presence, walls that surrounded state-run enterprises and family housing, and the restricted Harbor, almost the entire coastal region used to be inaccessible to Kaohsiung residents.




Figure 2 Hāmásing Map

Created by Xuanpei Lai 賴萱珮

On paper, the city occupied an important position in the state's military and economic schemes, having served as the center for export-oriented production and the base of state-run ship-building, petroleum, and steel production since the 1960s. In reality, its fragmented landscape created a space of disconnection and unequal access, reminding its residents daily that their place in this picture of national prosperity was on the margin and their daily movement was constantly restricted and monitored by the state. While the goods flew smoothly from factories to the harbor, residents bore the burden of chaotic and often dangerous traffic and heavy pollution. This uneven development between Kaohsiung as the site of production and the capital city of Taipei as the site of financial gain became all too visible when a deadly gas explosion in the summer of 2014 blew open Kaohsiung's streets and exposed the intermingled underground pipelines carrying toxic and sometimes flammable chemicals through densely populated areas. Political squabbles between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Democratic Progress Party (DPP), the ruling parties in the central government and Kaohsiung respectively, ensued. A few KMT politicians were perhaps unwisely tried to turn the incident against incumbent DPP mayor Chen Chu and her quest for re-election. Chen, a savvy and charismatic politician, made the incident into a platform showcasing her administration's efficiency and grounds for denouncing the central government's exploitation of the city. The streets were restored in mere months and the new light rail system, although slightly delayed, began test runs in 2015. Crisis became cause, which reaffirmed the city's resilience and engendered a vision for a new and improved city with better connectivity. This incident and its aftereffects show in microcosm the metamorphosis that made Kaohsiung Harbor area into the kind of waterfront leisure place it is now. Political tug-of-war, interurban competition, and post-industrial transformation all contributed to, if not necessitated, the reconstruction and rebranding of Kaohsiung to meet political and economic imperatives.

Kaohsiung residents' sense of injustice brought about by decades' of uneven development, Anru Lee (2013) observes, was played up by the DPP to secure tax payers' support for its costly projects. Through large-scale public events, physical makeovers, and promotional activities, the city government has constructed a landscape and narrative that rebrands Kaohsiung as an international urban center and a true rival of Taipei. Frank C.T. Hsieh, Kaohsiung's first DPP mayor, proposed to make the city into an "ocean capital" during his campaign in 1998. By "capital," he meant that "Kaohsiung will not only represent Taiwan" but also enjoy "the standard of life befitting a capital" (Hsieh 2005). In other words, Kaohsiung would catch or surpass Taipei in its national importance and quality of life. Under Hsieh and his successors, Kaohsiung's "ocean" character was stressed with the extension of

city roads to the harbor to make it more accessible and the construction of multi-purpose commercial and trade zones that included the development of waterfront leisure facilities. These ambitious and ever-changing projects were eventually placed under the umbrella of the Kaohsiung Multifunctional Commerce and Trade District development plan. Chief among the new development is the boldly-named “Asia New Bay Area” project that encompasses a 500-hectare stretch along Kaohsiung Harbor and its surrounding area.⁹

In this overall design, the Second Port Entrance, the southern and newer half of the Port of Kaohsiung, stretching from Linya District to Siaogan District, serves as an international container terminal and trade center. Land and properties held by the Port of Kaohsiung, Taiwan Railway Administration (TRA), and state-run enterprises have been developed into office and commercial complexes. With all the transshipment functions moved to the Second Port Entrance, the northern part of Kaohsiung Harbor, the First Port Entrance, has been transformed into a leisure and tourism area.¹⁰ During Hsieh’s first term, Kaohsiung was awarded the National Day firework display and Taiwan Lantern Festival by then-president Chen Shui-bien in his attempt to “balance the south and the north” and secure support of the DPP’s stronghold in southern Taiwan. Hsieh used these opportunities to initiate the physical transformation of the waterfront. The fences surrounding Pier 22 were the first to go down to make room for the celebrations. Once opened to the public, Pier 22 (Singuang Ferry Wharf) became the first of many seaside parks in Kaohsiung. From there, the city proceeded southward, removing more walls and extending city streets to the waterfront. As the City has expanded its waterfront development, the annual Kaohsiung Lantern Festival has also increased its scope from Pier 22, to Pier 13 (Glory Pier, formerly used to transport military personnel) and to Pier 12 (Love Pier). Old warehouses on Pier 2 were renovated to provide spaces for performances

9 In addition to the city government’s various plans, the central government also proposed a Redevelopment Project for Kaohsiung Harbor and City under the umbrella of its 8-Year “i-Taiwan Projects” in 2008.

10 Key to this project was the relocation of Hongmaogang, one of the oldest settlements in Kaohsiung, to make room at the Second Port Entrance. That relocation, which affected more than 20,000 people, was first proposed in the late 1960s after the neighborhood was re-zoned as an industrial area. Investment in and construction of public facilities in the area by the city had been largely halted after the redesignation, and Hongmaogang was swallowed up by factories. Construction of any new buildings there was prohibited by the city. Pollution and heavy traffic in the harbor caused the decline of the local fishing industry, leaving Hongmaogang residents with few resources. The removal was completed in 2007, nearly four decades after the first group of residents had been moved.

and exhibits. Takao Depot, the old train station located between Pier 1 and Pier 2, was reincarnated as the Takao Railway Museum. Construction began on the Maritime Cultural and Popular Music Center located between Pier 11 and Pier 15 in 2013. Promenades were built along riverbanks, revitalized with bright street lamps and outdoor facilities. Bridges over Love River, the major canal running through the city, were decorated with lights, presenting a spectacular nightscape with spaces for outdoor activities on cool tropical evenings.

In Kaohsiung's self-fashioning, transportation has become symbolic of forward-moving progress and an enhanced quality of life. Because of its future orientation, infrastructure embodies possibility and generates visions for the future even as it inevitably runs its life course and becomes a "future ruin" (Howe et al. 2016). This future orientation and seeming permanence allows infrastructure to suggest stability, progress, and modernization. The construction of the rapid transit system and light rail promises further advancement through technology and connectivity. That Kaohsiung now has a new public transport network that requires technical capability and administrative coordination is more important than whether or not the city really needs it. Its greatest function, then, is to confirm Kaohsiung's inclusion in the ranks of advanced urban centers and serve as a powerful political symbol (Lee 2013).¹¹ Moreover, transportation infrastructure offers a romantic connection to a past that is still recent enough to fit into narratives of the city and the island's growth. As symbols of modern energy and mobility of the olden days (Schivelbusch 1977), railroads in particular can both represent progress and conjure up nostalgia for a bygone era. The theme of transportation also presents an "escape" from daily routine and a "departure" to a different world (Goss 1996). Therefore, transportation infrastructure frequently is transformed into leisure space and a display of local history in the marketing of places and reconstruction of localities. Takao Railway Museum, a ruin of yesteryear's transportation system, acts as a reminder of Kaohsiung's part in Taiwan's economic development, whose preservation offers a ready platform for a narrative of perpetual growth. That it has been turned into a museum also gives the city more "cultural capital" in the competition for national and global attention (Kong 2007). The redevelopment of the waterfront, too, gives the city a cosmopolitan image that may potentially attract more investment in commerce and real estate.

In a few short years, Kaohsiung's waterfront has gone from a *terra incognita* to

11 With the promise of future development, the subway lines also have the potential to fuel real estate speculation.

residents to a popular leisure destination. Conversations with natives and long-term residents in the early and mid-2000s revealed that most of them were unfamiliar with the Harbor and the city's coastal region except for Sizihwan Beach and the nearby ferry terminals. Many had no idea how many docks Kaohsiung Harbor had and were puzzled by how one single harbor could stretch over 12 kilometers. But in a few short years, they have adjusted to the city's new landscape, hiking on Takao Mountain, biking along Love River, strolling down the green corridors that used to be rail tracks, and visiting waterfront parks regularly. Colorful bridges, skyscrapers along the river banks and oceanfront, and the panoramic view of clear sky over Kaohsiung Harbor have replaced the gloomy factories and smog as the city's hallmark image. "Kaohsiung has become beautiful," residents often say. Not only that, it is also perceived to be "safer." The air is safer to breathe (at least the sky looks bluer); the water is safer to drink (at least it is now possible to boat on Love River); and the space has been opened up, making the city safer to navigate. The waterfront has been rediscovered, and with that, the often-overlooked old neighborhoods, whose histories and difficulties arising from the development of new waterfront facilities, have begun to enter public discussion, sometimes as matters that amuse and sometimes as sites of controversy.

Gateway to a Modern Past

It was under the promise of waterfront development, tourism, and a better-connected city that the wooden house on Jiesing Street collapsed. And accommodating the growing number of visitors gave the city a rationale for confiscating a plot of land there for a parking lot. According to land-use zoning dating back to the Japanese period, that block, denoted as Lot 3, was designated as reserve land for public facilities intended for transportation uses.¹² Because of this designation, residents there only hold title to the houses; the land itself belongs to the city. On March 15, 2012, the city government suddenly notified residents that they had three months to leave their houses. Startled residents, Hámásing-based NGOs, and patrons of a coffee shop on the block quickly assembled to take action.

12 According to Japan's urban planning in the first half of the twentieth century, "public facility designation...was primarily a declaration of intent to indicate where a road, park, etc., would be built" in the future when funding is secured (Sorensen 2002: 121). The designation would regulate or restrict activities and construction on the land, but the actual building of the facility would not immediately or necessarily ever take place. Lot 3's status has been in limbo since the designation. Post-war administrative chaos added to the confusion and legal tangle in which residents now find themselves.

They rang their city councilmen, rallied supporters through social media, and in just two weeks organized a protest. More than one hundred supporters showed up at the rally on March 27, and the event made national news. The city responded quickly, retrieving the order that same day, perhaps, protesters speculated, to avoid further negative press. The houses are safe for the time being, but their continued existence remains an unsettled matter.

The controversy brought Lot 3 to public attention. To prepare an argument for its preservation, supporters proceeded to survey the area and document existing buildings. What started as a struggle for housing rights began to be phrased in terms of the historic significance and aesthetic value of the wooden structures. At first, Lot 3 was simply referred to as a “Hámásing city block.” Eventually, the old name Xinbin resurfaced. With the resurrection of a name from the Japanese period, a narrative of Xinbin’s pivotal role in Kaohsiung’s history also emerged. This narrative in many places echoes the railway aficionados’ (*tiedaomi*) advocacy for the preservation of Takao Depot when the City began redeveloping the coastal area in the 2000s. Both narratives claim that Kaohsiung’s development from a fishing village to a modern city began in Hámásing under the Japanese with the construction of a harbor and the coastal rail line. Takao Depot was dubbed the “root of Kaohsiung’s history, industry, economy, and culture” (Wang 2009: 7) as well as the “birthplace of Southern Taiwan’s modern civilization” (Hsieh n.d.), and Hámásing was hailed as the “entry way (*menhu*) to Kaohsiung,” the doorway to its development (TRS 2015). Accordingly, many of Kaohsiung’s firsts took place in Hámásing: the first modern elementary school, the first neighborhood served by electricity and running water, and the first modern city blocks (Chang 2007, Lee et al. 2015).¹³ These, along with the area’s clear layout and transportation facilities, positioned Hámásing, and by extension Kaohsiung, not only in the vanguard of the island’s economic and technological development but also made it a shining example of modern urban planning in Taiwan.

In these stories, Japan’s presence is palpable, for the strategic placement of transportation facilities, the orderly street grids, and the water pipes and electric lines were all part of its plan to develop the harbor for military and economic purposes. During Japan’s own transition to a colonial power and a modern state in the Meiji period (1868-1912), architecture and urban planning had been a key tool for building new political and social order, developing industry and commerce, defining identity,

13 Similar to the case of Takao Shrine, there is a mutual borrowing of terms and ideas between preservationists, academics, and official narratives. Studies on Kaohsiung’s history and Hámásing’s special place in it have been published in and cited by publications from the city, NGOs, and commercial presses.

and, most importantly, attaining international recognition as a modern nation (Coaldrake 1996). The subsequent Taisho period (1912-1926) was also a “major watershed in the development of Japanese city planning” (Sorensen 2002: 89), when Japan passed its first comprehensive urban planning law that established a framework for urban development that lasted into the 1960s. Meanwhile, as Japan’s colony, Taiwan became a laboratory for its scientific governance through survey, calculation, and rational planning, which often took cues from Western powers. Japanese designers and engineers tested their ideas and technological innovations in Taiwan. Their experience in the colony, in turn, was brought back to Japan and implemented in Japanese cities (Sorensen 2002, Wu 2010). Following concepts of modern planning that “forced openness on the urban form, overcoming the closure characteristic of premodern cities” (Graham and Marvin 2001: 60), Taiwanese cities went from walled citadels and market towns to orderly urban spaces with integrated infrastructural networks and rationally designed gridded plans.¹⁴

After it acquired Taiwan from the Qing Empire in 1895, Japan identified the construction of transportation infrastructure as a top priority for developing the island to support capitalist production and for deploying military personnel to suppress insurgences efficiently (Ka 1995, Knapp 2007). In 1898 Japan began the construction of what became the foundation of today’s north-south rail line. The completion of the route in 1908 dramatically altered Taiwan’s spatial organization. Before then, transportation on the island had relied primarily on waterways, meaning the west coast was divided into isolated regions by rivers. Once the Western Main Route connected previously isolated settlements, the island became integrated into a comprehensive space. Towns along waterways and smaller seaports made way for large harbors. Transportation that used to orient towards the west coast became oriented towards Japan along a north-south axis. In the north, Keelung harbor linked Taiwan to Japan. In the south, Dagou became the gateway to the South China Sea in Japan’s economic-political geography.¹⁵

14 A Chinese citadel’s spatial layout emphasizes its defensive function and is informed by geomancy and a power relation based on cosmological order (Wu and Gaubatz 2013). Although streets within the walls are laid out in an orderly grid pattern, their widths often vary and structures such as temples and administrative compounds often interrupt them. Market towns grew along rivers and ports, and their streets often zigzagged along the waterways. The major spatial changes introduced by Japan involved straightening the streets, standardizing street widths and building lots sizes, and removing obstacles to traffic flow such as walls, Qing administrative structures and in some cases, parts of temple compounds.

15 Although the Chinese characters mean “hit dog,” the name actually derived from an aboriginal term whose meaning is now unclear. Because of Dagou’s negative connotation, the Japanese changed it to

Unlike other major Taiwanese cities where spatial transformation under the Japanese prioritized political control and administrative needs (Su 2010; but see Allen 2012), Kaohsiung's design emphasized outward connectivity and circulation (Huang 2003, Liu 2016, Tai 1994). Up until the 19th century, the main settlements on what is now known as Kaohsiung were two walled administrative cities, Zuoying and Fengshan, and seaside villages clustered around Dagou lagoon (Tai 1994). The shift of sugar production from the Tainan area to today's Kaohsiung and Pingtung contributed to Dagou's emergence as an export port for sugar. In 1858 Dagou became one of the five ports in Taiwan to be opened to Western trade under Tianjin Treaty, officially turning it into an "international port with outward connectivity" (Liu 2016: 8). Western traders set up business houses and customs in Shaochuantou, the fishing village located on the northeast coast of Dagou lagoon. However, development of the port was slow because the Qing administration was more concerned about defensive work than maintaining navigation channels. It was the Western traders, mainly American and British, who were more enthusiastic about dredging and building docking facilities (Liu 2016, Tai 2011). After Taiwan was ceded to Japan, a series of construction projects to expand the harbor were undertaken and phases of urban planning to accommodate growth and transportation needs were devised. With a deep-water port that could handle big cargo ships and docks that could handle heavy machinery, Dagou developed into Taiwan's second largest trading port.

Dagou Depot was built near the harbor in 1900. By 1904, the railway administration had identified the need for more space to house rail facilities and warehouses, and began land reclamation using the soil recovered from dredging and harbor construction. As salt pans and muddy lowlands became solid ground, the foundation of the coastal rail line was also laid. Soon, the volume of cargo exceeded the capacity of the harbor. Under the 1908 plan to expand the harbor, a bigger piece of land was reclaimed. Two administrative units, Minato-chō (Zhou-ting in Mandarin Chinese) and Shinhama-chō (Xinbin-ting), were established on the fill land between the new harbor and Takao Mountain. The train station was moved one kilometer south to Shinhama-chō and locals began calling the reclaimed ground Hámásing in Minnan after the coastal rail line "Hamasen." By then, the old seaside settlements had all been incorporated into Japan's planning for the growing city and building codes were enforced in existing as well as new neighborhoods.¹⁶

Takao in 1920. The kanji characters are pronounced "Kaohsiung" (Gaoxiong).

16 The first building code in Taiwan was enacted in 1898. Building standards were implemented in Shaochuantou and Chihou in 1906, before the passage of the first major city plan, the 1908 Dagou City Improvement Ordinance (Liu 2016).

In 1920, Dagou was renamed Takao and a new phase of planning for urban growth began in 1921, once again accompanying expansion of the harbor and rail lines. The city's administrative and commercial center shifted as railway construction extended inland. Planning for the construction of a new downtown with a new train station was sketched out in 1936 while Takao (Dagou) Depot continued to serve the harbor, at first to transport agricultural and industrial products and then to carry military personnel and supplies as Japan embarked on its expansion to Southeast Asia.

The successive projects to make Takao into Taiwan's industrial production base and transportation hub left clear marks on Kaohsiung's landscape. The colonies were seen as a "blank page" or "void territory" by Japanese administrators and planners, so "city planners' strong technical abilities were unconstrained by the political and social constraints of the home country" (Sorensen 2002: 142).¹⁷ This notion of a "void territory" was especially compelling in Dagou since, when Japan took over Taiwan, the settlements by Dagou lagoon had fewer than 5,000 inhabitants in total (Tai 1994). The city of Dagou was essentially built from scratch on reclaimed ground and, in the view of the colonizers, "empty" fields. They were able to impose their ideals of rational planning by building brand new city blocks with public facilities and straight roads of uniform widths that could accommodate modern infrastructure such as power lines and drainage. Roads and railways extending through new neighborhoods to the piers enabled shipping between different modes of transportation. The grid street system was easy to navigate and the placement of transportation facilities had been carefully plotted to manage the unimpeded flow of products between the industrial zones and the harbor. The result was a neatly designed city that had been commended by some as the best representation of modern urban planning in Taiwan (Huang et al. 1992, Wang 2002).

Japanese urban planning provided the infrastructural foundation and physical framework for Kaohsiung's development into an industrial center under the KMT after World War II.¹⁸ In Kaohsiung's postindustrial transformation at the turn of this century, it continues to play an important but different role. A cityscape that was designed for industrial production and transportation of goods has been transformed into a space for global capital flows in the form of commerce, real estate investment,

17 In a similar vein, TRS' tour guides would point to the stylistic blending and borrowing that "would have been considered outlandish in Japan" in Hámásing's architecture as evidence of the unconstrained possibility for innovation in the colony. See the next section for TRS' walking tours.

18 The 1938 zoning plan established Zuoying and Nanzhi in the north and Siaogang in the south as industrial zones. Hamasen and the design of a loop rail system that was never fully executed became the base of coastal lines that connected the harbor to the industrial areas.

and tourism. By building this new transportation network on the foundation of existing structures and selectively preserving sites of old transportation facilities, the city has fashioned itself as capable, efficient, culturally sensitive, and technologically advanced. Frank Hsieh and his successors identify waterfront areas as public spaces that are, in essence, open spaces that can function as retreats or recreational zones for residents and visitors. Residents' ready access to parks, waterfront, and the previously inaccessible harbor has been branded as a manifestation of the democratic principle and a denunciation of authoritarianism (associated with the KMT's heavy-handed rule over five decades). Urban space has been "returned" to its people. In a broad stroke, accessibility, democracy, and the commercialization of open space have been blended together in the vision of a progressive and livable city.

In the design to open the coastal area and build new transportation infrastructure, Taiwan Railway Administration's cooperation was crucial: Sizihwan Station was built on TRA land, the light rail route would overlay defunct coastal lines, and access roads to the harbor would also go through TRA property. In return for releasing the land, TRA bargained for a zoning change from transportation to commercial. As the city government and TRA went through negotiations, TRA quietly took down some of its own facilities and demolished old dormitories. It took preservationists years to lobby the city government, exert pressure on TRA, and convince the Ministry of Culture to intervene before TRA agreed to preserve Takao Depot as well as part of the rail yard. Preservation of the rail yard, however, was only a temporary measure. For TRA, the land is valuable real estate, and even though the city government designated the rail yard, the old train station, and the attached platform a "cultural landscape" in mid-2015, TRA still holds the right to develop other parts of the property for commercial purposes.¹⁹

Preservationists saw the city government's passivity in preserving this "valuable asset of railway culture," as betraying a "lack of historical sensitivity." The identification of the waterfront as accessible public space also raises challenges regarding just what makes these places public and stimulates demands for civic participation in urban planning. Supporters of Takao Depot's preservation argue that the DPP administration's lack of effort in this area shows disregard for local heritage and a disconnect from residents.²⁰ As the city steadfastly ploughs along in its quest

19 See, Hsieh (2012: 102-135) for details on Kaohsiung's development, TRA's railway underground project, and the abolishment of the coastal line.

20 The city government put itself in a quandary when it granted TRA a zone change and made the area adjacent to Takao Depot a high-capacity commercial zone. The Cultural Affairs Bureau and Urban Development Bureau had to reach a compromise while at the same time trying to convince TRA to

for profit, it leaves too much destruction in its path and makes too little room for participation. One preservationist named He-yen argues that old buildings, especially ones that have functioned as public spaces, have meaning for urban residents. The authorities and property owners therefore need to assume public responsibility (*gonggong zeren*) for preserving these sites of common memory. The city should not design the waterfront area and plan for the future of old buildings just to cater to big corporations, even though the buildings there are now owned by private or semi-private proprietors. The “public” in public space is not defined strictly in the sense of proprietary interest, but rather in the combination of use and ownership.²¹ However, who is this “public” that can decide the fate of these spaces? And in a society where private ownership is protected by law, how can the public intrude on the owners’ right to handle their properties? To these questions, He-yen gave an ambiguous answer. Even though he divides the sides of the preservation battle into common people and NGOs versus government and big corporations, when it comes to private properties with public significance, common people can fall into the same category as corporations and should be regulated by a state that knows its public responsibility.²² The NGOs’ work is to make the common people, the big corporations, and the state aware of their public responsibility. In the end, he believes in collective decision-making by the “public”. But this public has to be a collection of qualified individuals

relinquish what it considered its lawful right to develop the property. The city, TRA, and Ministry of Transportation and Communication (which oversees TRA) were all involved in the negotiation. For those unfamiliar with government divisions, however, this discordance makes little sense since they are “all government.” The city government took the blame because many consider preservation the responsibility of local Cultural Affairs Bureau.

- 21 The shifting, ambiguous, and sometimes contradictory meaning of public space points to its inherent contradiction and to the fact that its status as “public” (and who counts as the “public”) involves constant struggle, adjustment, and maintenance. Kohn (2013), for example, examines why the Occupy Movement in Toronto was ruled a “privatization” of public space and points out the diverging views of a sovereign understanding of public space, in which a space’s publicness is contingent upon state legitimization and the populist understanding in which the public emerges outside the state. In a different context, Sand discusses how the plaza in Japan embodies two different ideals of public place, one that is “the site of a public formed through spontaneous and unorchestrated interaction” and the other, “the site of a public formed through unified mass action” (2013: 27). See Low (2000) and Mitchell (2003) for more discussions on different conceptions of public space.
- 22 He-yen’s argument recalls Weller’s analysis of the meaning of *gong* (public) in Chinese. Weller maintains that “*gong* could refer to anything in the public interest, including actions of the state” and “contrast[s] especially with ‘private’ interests” (1999: 27). This, in turn, produces an understanding of civil society (*gongmin shehui*, society of public persons) that is not necessarily outside or in opposition to the state, an understanding that is incongruent with its classic definition.

who have attained a “sensitivity to history” and are willing to push the city towards preserving sites of common memory.

The “assets of railway culture” represented by architectural structures and technical devices, although significant to engineers and railway aficionados, do not necessarily register strongly with others. Preservation advocates, therefore, do not always view them from the perspective of railway culture. For some *tiedaomi*, the best preservation scenario would acknowledge the facilities’ original function and keep them in operation, even if that only meant preserving two hundred meters of track for the engines to run back and forth on. An official from Kaohsiung City, however, pointed out that “if the facilities were in operation, there would be no need for preservation to begin with.” The high cost of keeping the trains running and the lack of skillful technicians to maintain and drive them in the end prevented the city from “resuming operation in situ” (*yuandi fushi*) as some *tiedaomi* had hoped. Preservationists, the city, and TRA met halfway and the facilities were turned into a park and a museum that would appeal to the general public and complement other tourism development on the waterfront.²³ As they were transformed into a designated cultural heritage and recreational space, the railway facilities achieved a different kind of linkage, reaching back to the city and the island’s past.

College student Hui-yi explains that her reason for participating in preservation efforts was a concern that “what Taiwan lacks most is history,” and to demolish the station and facilities would “erase the traces of Taiwan’s footsteps.” By “lacking history,” she means the absence of recognition of certain past(s) and of a local history that can be traced to something tangible—because “history” is always somewhere else and old things are constantly being destroyed in the pursuit of development. Since the 1990s, there has been a growing appreciation in Taiwan for architecture from the Japanese period and the (re)discovery of a Taiwan-centered history as

23 Due to TRA’s reluctance to preserve the properties, they are unwilling to provide technical assistance to the city to maintain and operate the engines and the facilities. TRA handed over management of the museum but requested that the city not use the building and railyard for commercial purposes or it could be asked to pay a stiff rent for the properties. The city subcontracts with the Railway Culture Society, a non-governmental preservationist group that actively lobbied for its preservation, to operate the museum. To honor the city’s agreement with TRA, admission to the museum is free and it does not sell souvenirs. Because of the long preservation battle, there remains a level of tension between the Society, TRA, and Kaohsiung City. Even though Takao Railway Museum is a public facility managed by the city government, the “about us” section on its official website has a detailed account of the preservation battle, with open criticism of the city government and TRA. The museum also joined Hámásing Vision Alliance under its official title instead of the Railway Culture Society, further muddling the boundary between the official facility and the NGO.

opposed to the China-centered history promoted by the KMT. Instead of seeing this trend as an affirmation of Japanese colonialism, Yoshihisa Amae argues that, to some, “the colonial past is a local past” (2011: 53) and the retelling of this past is filtered through the prism of Taiwanese experience. A recent college graduate named Hong-wu, for example, maintains that “it is a simple fact that the Japanese were here.” A 48-year-old Kaohsiung native, Tsiu-eh, echoes that observation: “Having been colonized is part of what we are,” and there is no need to avoid this fact. From this perspective, erasure of Japanese presence, whether in textbooks or in urban space, is an erasure of Taiwan’s past and of Kaohsiung itself.

More than arguing for or against a particular version of history, artist Ah-shuo feels that Taiwan is special because “we have a mix of many things.”²⁴ Only in Taiwan will one see “Chinese refugees living in Japanese dormitories built by Taiwanese craftsmen.” Kaohsiung is especially rich in this respect due to its abundance of military housing and state-run enterprises that still make use of Japanese buildings. To relinquish this multicultural past and create a city that looks like any other city would strip Kaohsiung of its character. Kaohsiung needs to remember how it came into being so it can carve out its own path. Preservation is not a total rejection of economic development or the idea of progressing towards a better prospect. The presence of the station, the railway, and the old city blocks allows narratives of Kaohsiung’s emergence to build upon something tangible. Retrofitting this past within a story of technological advancement appeals to most Taiwanese people’s understanding of the island’s history as one of perpetual growth towards increasing modernization. The failure to acknowledge this history of modernization indicates a “wrong kind of progress” and perhaps a step back from advancing into the ranks of advanced countries. As one preservationist puts it, “We are still at [the stage of] preservation 1.0, fighting to save individual buildings, while European countries are already in preservation 4.0 and thinking on a scale of entire cities.”

Reference to prewar Japanese construction is inevitable when arguing for Hámásing’s historical importance since its streets, architecture, and its very own existence bear clearly identifiable imprints of Japan’s urban planning. The railway areas provide physical evidence of the city’s growth, and their preservation, therefore, allows tangible experience of this history of technological achievement and modernization. This backward glance to the city’s outward connectivity accords

24 It can be argued that many places are “a mix of many things,” and Taiwan is not at all unique in being multicultural or having traces of a colonial legacy. Claiming Taiwan as uniquely multicultural should, therefore, be understood in the context of local resistance to a China-centered reading of its past and the desire to tout something Taiwanese.

it a perpetually modern character, a return to a modernity that promises a different future. The triumph of colonial power over Kaohsiung's natural landscape and human settlements is met by the local desire to make it "ours" and to accord the city a history. The Takao Renaissance Society (*Dagou Wenshi Zaixing Huishe*, TRS) argues in its publication that Takao came into being because the harbor attracted "Chinese fishermen and salt field workers, Western missionaries, traders, explorers, and naturalists" and because the Japanese government's "introduction of modern development through [new] modes of production in harbor and sugar industry" brought more immigrants to the city (2015: 152). Most of the people who contributed to the city's growth were the underclass (*diceng*) laborers. Therefore, "*diceng* culture" is the real mainstream culture of the city.²⁵ "Looking from the perspective of a long history," one publication proposes, "be it the colonizer or colonized, oppressor or oppressed, different cultures will always blend together and the traces of these encounters and blending are the cultural characteristic of an international harbor city" (ibid.: 153). The city is therefore depicted as having always been a networked node whose urban landscape has emerged out of global flux and transnational visions. Any friction, in this view, lies not in two centuries of political and economic struggle but in the removal of the traces left by the masses through profit-oriented development that only wants "culture" to be the decoration of leisure spaces.

Shimin Space

As the city continued its grand projects on the coast, local organizations turned their attention to the streets, calling for slowing down and scaling down the work to reconnect with Hámásing. Conceived as space for the efficient flow of bodies, capital, and goods a century ago, Hámásing's straight and neatly organized streets become the stage on which ideals of civic participation and (yesteryear's) social connectedness were played out. Unlike the meandering and narrow streets in many of Taiwan's older neighborhoods, Hámásing's streets have been unmistakably

25 Here is another instance of mutual borrowing between official narratives and preservation efforts. During the 2000s, partially encouraged by labor rights activists, the DPP began to stress Kaohsiung's industrial past and celebrate working-class contributions to the city through events such as film festivals, the proposal for a labor museum, and labor-themed public artworks. This strategy allowed the DPP to hold on to working-class support and distinguish Kaohsiung from other Taiwanese cities as factories were closing down and manufacturing jobs were dwindling. TRS picked up this narrative but turned it against the city government which, in their view, sees abandoned factory facilities only as potential tourism sites or real estate properties and neglects to recognize them as physical evidence of the city's working-class past.

modern from their inception. This character, combined with the area's status as the oldest modern urban grid in Kaohsiung, makes it possible for the streets to simultaneously embody a democratic publicness often associated with modern city life and recall an ideal of social connectedness lost in the onslaught of late capitalism. The streets, nine meters in width, are narrow by Kaohsiung's current standard but still wide enough to allow local NGOs to set up street fairs, outdoor movie showings, and walking tours.²⁶ Through these activities and the simple act of walking the streets, participants come to experience Hámásing as a modern neighborhood of frequent social encounters, history, and old-style charm. The spatial poetics of not only oral narratives but also the "collective nonverbal improvisation and 'performance' of...spaces and identities" (Dalagoglou 2010: 144) bring focus to the streets, making them and their arrangement highly visible and perceptible. How streets should be used and what kind of streets city residents need becomes key in arguing against headlong development.

Traffic, for one, makes the streets of Hámásing a contested ground both figuratively and literally. Different demands for transportation needs and street uses brought local residents into dispute with the city. Although they enjoy green spaces and the waterfront as much as visitors do, they cannot leave the neighborhood at the end of the day. The more leisure space is created to improve quality of life in Kaohsiung, the more their lives are disrupted. Local organizations estimate that more than two hundred and fifty tour coaches rumble through the area each day on their way to Sizihwan Beach.²⁷ Parking is always a struggle and the caravans of tour coaches cause terrible congestion, making it dangerous to walk or drive in the neighborhood. Bound by shared concerns over traffic, a coalition of Hámásing-based environmental and community organizations, residents, religious organizations, and scholars from nearby National Sun Yet Sen University formed in early 2015. The Hámásing Vision Alliance staged a rally in front of the tunnel connecting Hámásing and National Sun Yet Sen University on April 29, 2015, calling for the city to put a cap on the number of tour coaches and come up with measures to relieve traffic congestion.²⁸ Protesters engaged flash mob protests, quickly moving from the tunnel

26 In comparison, Hsinchu City's local organization has commented that the narrow streets and lack of sidewalks there have made it dangerous to conduct walking tours. Participants have to constantly watch out for motorists and often have no place to go when they need to dodge an approaching vehicle.

27 <http://www.cm.nsysu.edu.tw/files/14-1022-115912,r160-1.php?Lang=zh-tw>. Accessed April 15, 2016.

28 NSYSU began imposing a cap of 35 coaches allowed in the parking lot by Sizihwan Beach on April

to reassemble to block the streets, then disperse before the police could cite them for violation of the Assembly and Parade Act. By placing their bodies in the middle of traffic, they brought to public attention the disruption of neighborhood life by tourism and outside traffic.²⁹

Back in 2012, conflict over transportation had also played out in public when the Lot 3 crisis brought out residents and supporters to stage a rally in protest. Following that demonstration, supporters began working on ideas that could bring people into the streets to show an alternative vision of neighborhood life, one not based on endless development but rather on equalitarianism and sociability. The “mosquito theater” (*wenzi dianyingyuan*), so-called because mosquitos are a constant presence outdoors, was one of these events. Open-air movie showing, an activity many Taiwanese remember (but never personally experienced) as a common occurrence in the not-so-distant past, suggests that city streets had once belonged to those who resided and worked in the neighborhood instead of motorists. When night fell, people from nearby blocks came together, bringing stools, food, drink, and hand-held fans to enjoy an evening with friends and neighbors. Nobody needed to dress up for the occasion. The entertainment and conviviality was open to people from all walks of life. After some of the Lot 3 supporters formed the Takao Renaissance Society, they organized mosquito theater in the neighborhood from time to time. But for the most part, TRS’ efforts have focused on guided tours, street fairs, talks, and workshops. Similar to the mosquito theater, the monthly street fair Xinbin Bazaar (*xinbin shiji*) turns the streets from traffic conduits into a space of social interaction. Vending stalls line one side of Jiesing Street and Guyuan Street along Lot 3 in front of Japanese-era shop-houses, sometimes on covered walkways (*qilou*) and sometimes on the street pavement. While browsing among the handicrafts, food, and drink on offer, pedestrians often wander into the middle of the street, effectively making the blocks a pedestrian zone. Slow moving pedestrians, vending tables, open-air movie showings with their audiences sitting in the middle of the streets halt traffic temporarily just as rallies and flash mob protests did. Instead of serving a transportation function, streets become the setting for strolling and socializing, and the speed and scale of city life is brought down to a much more intimate level.

Fairs and movie showings draw people out and offer opportunities for interaction among participants. While these are akin to what Setha Low (2000) has

25, 2015. Unable to access NSYSU, tour buses spilled into Hámásing and parked along neighborhood streets, exacerbating the already congested traffic.

29 Small-business owners in Hámásing do not wholly oppose the “intrusion” of outside traffic since it can bring in customers.

categorized as “ritual protest,” where a subversion of spatial order is restricted in time and space, and followed by a return to normalcy, the mosquito theater and bazaar events paradoxically evoke an imagination of everydayness and normalcy. This everydayness allows for this different kind of street dynamic to appear as ordinary and therefore an appropriate way of using the space. Ming-ming, a frequent participant in Xinbin Bazaar, lauds the street fairs as “less manufactured” than other commercial encounters. They give her a feeling of *shenghuo*, quotidian life, and bring her into contact with “real and diverse people.” Those real and diverse people at the bazaar sell hand-made objects, used books, and organic food, overtly or covertly conveying an environmental consciousness that appeals to an urbanite like Ming-ming who wants and can afford “less manufactured” things. Although most vendors sell goods, NGOs have also set up tables to collect signatures for the amendment of referendum law or to advocate for environmental conservation. A few vendors regularly display flags and stickers bearing anti-nuclear slogans or pro-independence statements. This display of political messages reveals that what appears as an everyday site for social encounter and commercial transaction is also considered a location where the exchange of ideas and discussion of public affairs can take place. The sociality of bygone days thus meets the ideal of a democratic public space in the streets of Xinbin.

The democratic ideal of political intercourse and collective action is linked to what is perceived as longstanding local ways of using open space that are in opposition to the city’s profit-driven planning. This intersection of neighborhood preservation, democratic participation, friendly socialization, and critiques of for-profit development ironically play out on streets that were once the product of deliberate politico-economic calculation. Yu-kui, a Kaohsiung native who has been active in preservation campaigns, believes that their success lies in having spaces where they can gather and disseminate ideas about preservation and alternative schemes for urban future. These spaces are not to be found in the planned areas of the waterfront but in traditional gathering places like the temple courtyard and the street. Citing Jane Jacobs (1961), as some of her comrades often do, she argues that for a city to thrive, “the government should not interfere with people’s life and [use of] public space.” The construction of parking lots and development of the waterfront is “planning for cars and profit” and not for residents of the city (*shimin*). Here, *shimin* is at once the pedestrians, vendors, and residents who cannot afford rising housing costs, and people who want to slow down a little to experience the city. On the other end of her divide is “the government,” “big corporations,” and “rational calculation for efficiency” by urban planners who conspire to destroy the ambience of the neighborhood. It can be argued that her idea of *shimin* is a mixture of many different groups with diverse and often conflicting interests. However,

what is interesting in her argument is the conceptual connection of *shimin* to street vitality and the assertion that pedestrians and residents (no matter how elusive the definition) are the protagonists of urban life opposed to the equally hard-to-define antagonists that take charge of planning and managing public facilities and open spaces. Also important is a belief in the existence of a public (the *shimin*) who, with the availability of sociable open space, are able to come together and collectively decide on a future that is greater than the pursuit of profit.

The ideal of streets for pedestrian use and socializing is sometimes supplemented by an appropriation of Japan's recent initiatives of *rojō kansatsu* (street observation) and neighborhood *sansaku* (strolling). Hámásing, whose Japanese-era houses are laid out with narrow footpaths between the buildings, easily lends itself to this conceptual borrowing. In hope of finding architectural gems by slowing down and paying attention to the small signs of the area's history, TRS offers walking tours, sometimes under the name of *sansaku* (pronounced *sance* in Mandarin).³⁰ It also publishes neighborhood maps, and hosts woodworking workshops augmented by projects in "urban archeology" (*chengshi kaogu*). Described as a treasure hunt, urban archaeology asks participants to investigate (*kao*) the city's past (*gu*) by closely scrutinizing the architecture, interviewing locals, and archival research (TRS 2015: 67). Participants are to uncover small gems and forgotten vestiges hidden in plain sight in the same vein as *rojō kansatsu* (Sand 2013). But while *rojō kansatsu* inspires individual appropriation, documentation, and classification of seemingly random objects, *chengshi kaogu* holds to an agenda of fostering understanding of architectural history and imparting to participants the idea that preservation can be done by an attentive local public. It stresses an aesthetic sensitivity and the intellectual competence to discern precious relics amid the clutter of indistinguishable buildings, make connections between those objects and the city's past, and then hopefully report them to the Cultural Bureau to be registered as historic assets when appropriate. Therefore, much like mosquito theater and the fairs, both occasions for forming connections and facilitating dialogue, doing *kaogu* carries with it a conviction in the potential of civic engagement and of building an

30 It is a common practice among preservationists and organizations with a preservation focus in Kaohsiung to appropriate Japanese terms for things ranging from architectural jargon to social trends. Often, when the terms are written in kanji or made up partially of kanji, they will not be translated into Chinese even if Chinese equivalents exist. Instead, the kanji characters are directly adopted but pronounced in Mandarin. These quasi-Chinese terms do not always make sense to a modern Chinese speaker. *Sansaku/sance* is one of them. To make sense of the term (which exists in classic Chinese but is no longer in use), TRS interprets it as "*sanbu celue*," a strolling tactic or plan, turning it from casual walking into something that requires a little guidance.

educated public who possess a sensitivity to history and awareness of the “public responsibility” He-yen alludes to. This notion of the public rests upon individuals and their aesthetics, but the personal appreciation of urban treasures is cultivated through a comprehensive vision of the city’s history as the experience of the urban masses’ quotidian life over the course of yesteryear’s modernization.

While using Japanese terms such as *sansaku*, the walking tours also have a local foundation in Taiwan. Chuang Ya-chung observes that in the 1990s a “vogue of the so-called neighborhood walking tour” emerged in Taiwan’s cities as a strategy for place-making and a way to consume a newly discovered or reinvented national history (2013: 178). A pedestrian culture also began to surface in Taipei where urban neighborhoods were reimagined as “hometowns” through organized walking tours and individual explorations. Through such guided walks, TRS also instills in their participants an imagination of the neighborhood as a collective hometown. Various routes have been devised, often tracing the footsteps of sojourners, long-term residents, and others who took part in the bustling activity on the coast or visiting the sites of business establishments in the first half of the twentieth century. These tours require participants to slow down and look carefully at their surroundings with a heightened awareness of everything “historic,” drawing attention to the built and social environment’s fragile existence given the constant destruction and rebuilding. While pointing out pre-war structures, docents often take the opportunity to denigrate the KMT’s erasure of much of this history and its patchwork of constructions over the fifty years of its rule in Kaohsiung and criticize the current administration’s profit-driven development. Physical violence exerted by the KMT during the post-war period, however, rarely enters the discussion. Some participants express a sense of pride when they realize how wide, open, and straight Kaohsiung’s old streets are. The fact that Kaohsiung was already modern and developed a century ago sometimes leads to questioning whether the city needs more development.

Tours serve another function: They bring people into Hámásing. Although there is no clear demarcation of the neighborhood, a vague sense of boundary might emerge from the different way people move. The street grids oriented 45 degrees off the cardinal directions come to a stop at Shaochuantou Wharf on the west side, Binhai First Road on the south, and Gushan First Road on the east.³¹ Even though the skewed grids extend one block beyond Linhai Second Road to Dengshan Street, because of the heavier traffic on Linhai New Road, it can sometimes act as a barrier to pedestrians. One participant in TRS’s workshop describes that how people move

31 This street orientation, Liu (2016) proposes, accommodates the railways because it runs parallel to the coastal rail line.

about there is very “Kaohsiung style.” When there is no car coming from the other direction, drivers often drive in the middle of the streets. Although there are covered walkways along buildings on both sides, pedestrians also tend to walk on street pavement instead of on walkways. As long-term residents of the city would know, this disregard for formal traffic rules occurs when one is in or near an area where one conducts daily business. People know that they are at the edge of a neighborhood when they start paying attention to traffic rules. Walking tours allow outsiders to venture into what they might otherwise consider as the interior of a neighborhood.

When walking “Kaohsiung style” or strolling neighborhood streets with eyes trained on old buildings, the sense of a more intimate, personal, and approachable city space and history emerges. This experience of walking the streets and sensing the city’s historic ambience conjures up an image of city streets not as a channel for commodities but a shared space and a passage of encounter—with history, lived experience, and fellow citizens. Instead of being just the ground along which people and things move, streets become the focus of efforts to sustain active civic engagement and make it possible to imagine the existence of an urban public. Nonetheless, participants in the fairs, tours, and workshops have expressed reluctance when asked whether they would take a more active role in public affairs. To them, such actions should still be initiated and guided by NGOs because they “know better” (*bijiao zhidao*). Taking part in these activities and walking through the neighborhood may produce appreciation for the historic ambience and a willingness to question urban development, but they do not always produce the kind of connection with residents the NGOs have proposed, no matter how every-day or intimate the experiences may seem. Moreover, discussions of civic affairs often take place in living rooms and offices before they are taken to the public space of the streets. Therefore, while the streets are a powerful metaphor of civic engagement and the urban public, their function as “public space” remains tenuous since the vision of collective action by individual residents towards a collective future frequently contradicts with the elusive and discrete *shimin* who do not form a singular (and qualified) collectivity.

Conclusion

In Kaohsiung, the transport network and streets make tangible for its residents the city’s colonial history and its integration into the globalized market. The forces of the state and global capitalism are perceptible, though not necessarily comprehensible, in the physical form of street grids, spatial barriers, the redeveloped harbor, a neglected railway facility, and the collapsed house on Jiesing Second Street. Development that accelerates global capital flows is experienced as a paradox instead

of a smooth transition since it threatens to alter the very landscape created earlier to facilitate circulation and erase sites that are evidence of Kaohsiung's historical emergence through regional and global exchange. The rail tracks that once led from Takao Depot to the harbor have been cut off by Linhai New Road, part of the city's project to open access to the waterfront. From the remaining platform at the depot, visitors can just glimpse the ocean and have to stretch their imaginations to envision what it was like when goods flowed there from land to sea and from sea to land. But as traces of the old network are erased from Kaohsiung's cityscape, the city's colonial past and the obscure neighborhood of Hámásing have gained increasing visibility. As the train station became disconnected from the harbor, the people of Kaohsiung began to discover its once inaccessible waterfront. As goods stopped flowing through Hámásing to the port, the neighborhood has been reconnected to the rest of the city by new transport networks. As light rail replaces the old railroad, the defunct depot is reoriented from outward connectivity to neighborhood access. These shifting connections and disconnections realign Kaohsiung and the neighborhood in relation to the city's colonial past, modern experience, and globalized aspirations, allowing the threads of modernization, connectivity, and civic life to be reshuffled and rearticulated in the formulations of its future and past.

"Newly developed networks," Brian Larkin argues, "do not eradicate old ones but are superimposed on top of them, creating a historical layer over time," which makes it possible for dormant networks and connections to reemerge or to be reworked in a new situation (2008: 252). As its post-industrial transformation turned previous structures into obstacles in the City's quest for global capital and political endorsement, its outdated transport infrastructure was rebranded as recreational space and cultural heritage. Development for capital has been cloaked in the language of democratizing urban space for the public. This new designation has opened the possibility for local actors to link the facilities and spaces to the modernity of a bygone era and define them as zones from where traditional sociability can meet future civic participation.

Because it sits right next to the Sizihwan Station, Takao Railway Museum is often the first stop before tourists set foot in Hámásing or proceed to the waterfront. Serving to introduce visitors to the neighborhood, it is now a cultural institution and part of Kaohsiung's tourist infrastructure. It is also a point of connection to the city's colonial past under Japan, a past that has been interpreted by preservationists as Taiwan's induction to the modern world characterized by rational urban planning, efficient circulation, global connectivity, and industrial production for capitalist market. The themes of planning, circulation, connectivity, and market have been repeated over and over throughout Kaohsiung's history and are the keywords that

frame its development today. By recalling a time when these themes were first manifested on the city's landscape, preservation efforts simultaneously subscribe to the modern belief in advancing towards future and oppose the city's planning for immediate profit under the ruse of (more) modernization. Kaohsiung was once modern but is now lagging behind other modern places not because it does not have modern design and modern facilities but because it lacks more "advanced" thinking. Therefore, instead of a nostalgic return to the past, its activists' efforts are a plea to move further into the future, to a "preservation 4.0" as opposed to the sporadic preservation work of contemporary Taiwan. The call to slow down is a call to move faster—to preserve the physical evidence of Kaohsiung's past before those vestiges are gone and catch up with more forward-thinking urban planning ideas. As He-yen says, "We are not there yet."

"Not there yet" is also the rationale behind the city government's endless quest for more development, more construction, and more change to the waterfront, a quest driven by the desire to surpass Taipei, become more attractive to capital, and advance to the status of an international urban center. In the process, residents' limited access to the decision-making process around the uses of public spaces has prompted questioning the espoused principle of democratic participation in urban planning. The preservation battle surrounding railway facilities and protests around traffic crises on Hámásing streets critique the city's singular vision of global connectivity. Taking part in the Hámásing Vision Alliance to protest city actions, Takao Railway Museum considers itself part of the network of neighborhood NGOs and asserts its role as *menhu* (entryway) to Hámásing. It is a site where *tiedaomi*, preservationists, and Kaohsiung's non-governmental cultural organizations can host events and tell stories about the neighborhood. TRS sees itself not as a community organization but as a platform (*pingtai*) where anyone interested in preservation and Kaohsiung's history can meet. Occasions such as street fairs and walking tours also facilitate the exchange of ideas and network-building among *shimin*. Based on the notion that Hámásing is the root of Kaohsiung's past modernization and the entryway to its modern future, preservation efforts have generated a different kind of connection and flow—that of civic networks and the distribution of democratic ideals.

Hámásing has always been modern. Visions of ideal civic life and conceptions of social connectedness have emerged out of its rational street systems and the ruins of its transportation infrastructure. As cultural heritage and open space presumably shared by all, the railway facilities and neighborhood streets allow residents and visitors alike to imagine a common history and city. The spaces produced through state projects and modern planning are now envisioned as the ground on which to

(re)build *shimin* life. They are alternatively imagined as the gateway to the modern past that gave birth to the city and to a democratic future where civic participation in determining sites of common memory and spaces of communal life is possible. These new nodes of connectivity hold potential for forming social and political networks and collective actions. But there is also a limit to this vision, because it hinges on an urban public with historic sensitivity and political energy who might walk Hámásing's streets, relax on the waterfront, and feel connected to the historic ambience of the city without necessarily being a part of the urban every-day of the neighborhood or even the city itself.

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水岸風雲： 高雄都市未來與市民生活想像競奪

許瀞文

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鐵道和港口交通建設在日治時期促進了高雄市哈瑪星一帶的聚落發展，也成了近年高雄市都市藍圖裡的要素。碼頭邊的水岸休閒空間、舊車站改裝的鐵道故事館與公園等，皆透過實體建築強調交通流動與現代都會，藉此建立高雄在臺灣經濟發展的地位，和成為未來商業與文化連結點的可能性。然而，這些發展也產生了交通混亂及鐵道和老街廓的保存抗爭，保存團體同樣援引交通建設與全球連結的歷史元素，重塑街區生活樣貌，並企圖藉由街道市集、步行導覽、戶外電影放映等緩慢的移動方式，吸引不同的人進入街區。本文企圖拆解殖民建設下的交通設施與街道空間如何形塑哈瑪星的歷史，又如何被援引、詮釋、使用，在種種敘事與行動中被（再）賦與意義。

關鍵詞：高雄，鐵道，街道，交通基礎建設，現代規劃
